

“Three Models of Civic Solidarity”

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THREE MODELS OF CIVIC SOLIDARITY

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[Note to UCLA readers: This paper explores an age-old question—how to forge unity out of diversity—in the context of contemporary concerns about immigration. It's the beginning of a larger project that will explore what fair terms of immigrant integration might look like and more generally, what sort of treatment noncitizens in liberal democratic societies are entitled to, as well as the ethics of immigration or first admissions. On the issue of immigrant integration, we need to consider what it is that immigrants are being asked to integrate into and what norms ought to guide the process of integration. This is what led me to explore different models of civic solidarity. I look forward to your comments. Thanks for reading.]

How can civic solidarity be forged across the diversity that characterizes contemporary liberal democracies? By civic solidarity I mean the bonds between members of a political community, a sense of belonging together. The question of how to forge solidarity across diversity is being pursued with renewed urgency in North America and Europe as many countries rethink their policies toward immigrants. Countries with a history of immigration, such as Britain and the Netherlands, have retreated from multiculturalism policies and adopted new citizenship tests aimed at the assimilation of immigrants. In the U.S. many have called for stricter immigration controls, in part on the grounds that immigration, especially immigration from Mexico, threatens to undermine the American way of life. The concern is not to prevent cultural change (that would be impossible), but to preserve what many take to be the core of a country's values and identity in the face of the incredible diversity generated by large-scale immigration.

Many political theorists thinking about issues of citizenship and immigration have responded to the challenges of diversity by offering models of belonging for political communities that aim to accommodate the diversity of its members. The theorist's impulse has been to move away from thicker, more maximal notions of community to identify a minimum commonality that must be shared, which by virtue of its minimalism leaves as much

room as possible for the expression of diversity. This paper examines three models of belonging for pluralistic democratic societies.

The task of developing new, more inclusive forms of civic solidarity is said to be important for several reasons. First, solidarity appears to be integral to the pursuit of social justice embodied in the institutions of the welfare state, including public education, health care, unemployment insurance, and old age pensions. These institutions serve as redistributive mechanisms that can offset the inequalities of life chances that a capitalist economy creates and raise the position of the worst-off members of society to a level where they are able to participate as equal citizens. While self-interest alone may motivate people to support social insurance schemes that protect them against unpredictable circumstances, solidarity is said to be required to support redistribution from the rich to aid the poor, including housing subsidies, income supplements, or long-term unemployment benefits.¹ This claim about the necessity of solidarity for social justice is based on psychological speculation for which social scientists like Robert Putnam have recently marshaled evidence: that people support redistributive schemes when they regard other participants in the scheme as like themselves in certain respects. For better-off people to support redistributive policies, they need to identify with the beneficiaries of the redistribution in some meaningful sense.

Solidarity is also seen to be important for addressing what we might call the problem of motivation in democratic societies. This problem is forcefully presented by Rousseau's account of freedom in a democratic state. He suggests that to legislate for one another in a way that is not dominating, democratic citizens must share a form of solidarity sufficient to motivate them to take one another's interests into account. Not only must citizens be inspired to participate, they must also be willing to moderate their claims in the hope of finding

¹ See Miller 2006: 328, 334.

common ground on which political decisions can be based. Political freedom cannot be realized by individuals pursuing their own interests; what is required is, in Habermas's words, "the *supportive spirit* of...legally noncoercible motives and attitudes of a citizenry oriented toward the common good."²

A third reason that articulating an ideal of civic solidarity is said to be important is strategic. In the absence of more inclusive models, it is said, racist and chauvinist models will prevail. The alternative to the Nehru-Gandhi secular definition of Indian national identity is the Hindu chauvinism of the Bharatiya Janata Party, not a cosmopolitan model of belonging. "And what in the end can defeat this chauvinism," asks Charles Taylor, "but some reinvention of India as a secular republic with which people can identify?"³ It is not enough to articulate accounts of identity and belonging only at the subnational or transnational levels while ignoring senses of belonging for the political community. One might believe that people have a real need to belong to a political community, perhaps grounded in even deeper needs for recognition, autonomy, and other values and goods that are best secured through membership in a political community, but even those skeptical of claims about the need for belonging to a political community might accept that in the absence of more inclusive alternatives, models preaching religious and racial intolerance may well prevail.

My aim in this paper is not to question the practical significance of civic solidarity, nor to argue that the relationship of co-citizens generates special responsibilities that they have to one another but not to others. For the purposes of this paper, I put these questions aside, and instead explore the content that contemporary political theorists have given to the idea of civic solidarity and consider the implications of the different models for the

² Habermas 1996: 499.

³ Taylor 1996: 121.

integration of immigrants. In section 1, I examine *constitutional patriotism*, which maintains that civic solidarity can and should be based on shared ideals or principles embodied in the constitution and political culture of a democratic society. This model is widely thought to reflect what it means to be an American. To be or become an American all that is required is a professed commitment to the political ideals embodied in the American constitution and American political culture. I argue that constitutional patriotism cannot in practice transcend ethnocultural elements, and this undermines its claim to be a distinctive alternative to nationalism. In section 2, I consider, *liberal nationalism*, which views a shared national culture as the appropriate basis for civic solidarity. Liberal nationalists defend the promotion of a common national culture on the grounds that it fosters the trust necessary for solving coordination problems, enabling deliberative democracy, and supporting redistributive policies of the welfare-state. I assess national identity's role in fostering these ends, and identify a challenge that liberal nationalists must address. In section 3, I examine a third model of solidarity, *deep diversity*, which acknowledges a diversity of ways of belonging to a political community. I argue that while deep diversity is the most inclusive of the three models, it is the least plausible since it is likely to be the result of civic solidarity rather than a possible basis for it. In section 4, I briefly consider the implications of these different models for the integration of immigrants.

1. Constitutional Patriotism

Habermas's account of constitutional patriotism (*Verfassungspatriotismus*) has assumed a prominent place in recent scholarly debates about the bases of social unity. It emerged out of a particular national history, to denote attachment to the liberal democratic

institutions of the post-war Federal Republic of Germany, but Habermas and others have taken it to be a general account for liberal democratic countries, as well as for supranational communities such as the European Union.⁴ Constitutional patriots believe that political communities can be sustained by agreement on shared values and principles, and argue for redirecting people's loyalty and attachments to the ideals embodied in a shared political culture rather than a pre-political community of descent. Habermas suggests that shared principles, not a shared ethnocultural identity, can and should be the basis of civic solidarity among citizens. The principles are expressed in the constitutions of liberal democratic societies. For constitutional patriots, constitutions are more than a set of regulative ideals constraining government power; they are also national symbols that foster civic unity and inspire loyalty.

1.1 The content and role of constitutional patriotism

First, some background. Constitutional patriotism is offered as a crucial supplement to the republican ideal of citizenship, which views citizens as free and equal legislators of the basic terms under which they live. Habermas observes that modern republican citizenship emerged out of the French Revolution in alliance with modern nationalism. Modern nationalism has relied on ethnocultural notions of identity to foster citizens' "social-psychological" attachment to the role of republican citizenship, which demands a high degree of personal sacrifice.⁵ Yet, republicanism and ethnic nationalism are not conceptually tied together. Republicanism must learn, Habermas says, "to stand on its own feet" because the fantasy of an ethnoculturally homogenous nation can only be pursued at the cost of

⁴ See Habermas 1996, 1998a, 1998b and Müller 2007.

⁵ Habermas 1996: 495.

intolerance and ethnic cleansing. The only normatively defensible alternative, he suggests, is to direct citizens' attachment toward a set of political principles and procedures. The "central idea of republicanism" is that the democratic process itself can serve as "a guarantor for the social integration of an increasingly differentiated society."⁶ The unity of an association of free and equal persons "ultimately rests only on the unity of a procedure to which all consent." The only "common denominator" for democratic citizenship is that "every citizen be socialized into a common political culture." He points to Switzerland and the United States as examples of multicultural societies where constitutional principles have taken root in a political culture without depending "on all citizens' sharing the same language or the same ethnic and cultural origins."⁷

What then grounds my loyalty to one polity and not another that professes the same ideals? "Each national culture develops a distinctive interpretation of those constitutional principles that are equally embodied in their republican constitutions—such as popular sovereignty and human rights—in light of its own national history."⁸ It is the embodiment of the principles in distinctive interpretations of the constitution and in a particular history that is the basis for solidarity and loyalty. Habermas insists, however, that such "particularist anchoring" does "not do away with one iota of the universalist meaning of popular sovereignty and human rights."⁹

Constitutional patriotism is offered as one answer to what I identified above as the problem of motivation in democratic societies. As Habermas and other republican theorists have emphasized, constitutionally protected liberties are "worth only what a population

⁶ Habermas 1998b: 117.

⁷ Habermas 1996: 496, 500.

⁸ Habermas 1998b: 118.

⁹ Habermas 1996: 500.

accustomed to political freedom and settled in the ‘we’ perspective of active self-determination makes of them.” Political freedom cannot be realized by individuals privately pursuing their own interests but only by all citizens together in “intersubjectively shared practice.” Modern coercive law cannot extend all the way down to the motives and basic attitudes of citizens to compel civic practices without violating basic liberties. Habermas presents his idea of constitutional patriotism as the way to motivate citizens’ support of constitutional principles and inspire “cooperative efforts of civic practice.” The universalist principles of constitutional democracy need to be “anchored” in the political culture of each country in such a way that constitutional principles “link up” with the motives and attitudes of citizens.¹⁰

1.2 Can constitutional patriotism transcend ethnocultural particularity?

To perform the motivating function, liberal democratic regimes have historically appealed to ethnocultural myths of common descent. Habermas himself recognizes the temptation for liberal democracies to “lurch into nationalism.” One reason is that the artificiality of national myths makes nationalism “intrinsically susceptible” to misuse by political elites in mobilizing citizens toward some common goal, whether in support of war or in diversion from class conflicts.¹¹ Political mobilization has historically called for an idea “vivid and powerful enough to shape people’s convictions” and to appeal “more strongly to their hearts and minds than the dry ideas of popular sovereignty and human rights.”¹² The

¹⁰ Ibid. 498-99.

¹¹ The other reason for the “lurch” into nationalism is that one cannot explain in purely normative terms how the political community should be composed. The boundaries marking off one political community from another are contingent, not voluntarily chosen by its members. Nationalism provides a solution to this problem of boundaries that has proved seductive in practice: nations are presented as organic developments that need no justification beyond their sheer existence (Habermas 1998: 115-16).

¹² Habermas 1998b: 113.

temptation of elites to appeal to ethnocultural myths has led many to make the empirical objection that “patriotism is not enough.”¹³ Attachment to constitutional norms may be insufficient for generating the kind of loyalty and sacrifice required by liberal democratic states. Such attachment may only be possible via “supplements of particularity.”¹⁴

One might reply that values and principles themselves can inspire loyalty among citizens and motivate them to political action. Think of Frederick Douglass’s attack on American hypocrisy for denying the cherished American values of liberty and equality to American slaves: “What, to the American slave, is *your* Fourth of July? I answer: a day that reveals to him, more than all other days in the year, the gross injustice and cruelty to which he is the constant victim. To him, your celebration is a sham; your boasted liberty, an unholy license... your shouts of liberty and equality, hollow mockery.”¹⁵ Or John F. Kennedy’s inaugural address calling on Americans to “ask not what America will do for you, but what together we can do for the freedom of man.” Appeals to values and principles can and do inspire political action, even if they alone have not been enough to motivate the kinds of sacrifices states typically require of citizens.

In any case, constitutional patriots are making more than an empirical claim about the motivational potential of a values-based solidarity. They are offering what they take to be a distinctive alternative ideal to nationalism. Even if constitutional patriotism is not widespread or does not yet exist in practice, constitutional patriots argue, we should encourage people to abandon nationalism and cultivate a sense of belonging based on shared ideals. The lesson that Habermas takes away from the tendency of liberal democracies to lurch into nationalism

¹³ See Canovan 2000 and also Schnapper 1994.

¹⁴ See Markell 2000 for discussion of constitutional patriotism in light of a larger body of Habermas’s scholarly and political writings. He argues that Habermas’s own reflections about the interdependence of facticity and validity suggest that attachment to constitutional norms is only possible via a “supplement of particularity.”

¹⁵ Douglass 2000: 42.

is to redirect citizen attachments away from “pre-political” conceptions of nationhood toward a “shared political culture.”

But the distinction between a “pre-political” ethnocultural nation and an ethnoculturally neutral “political culture” does not hold up. First, as many scholars of ethnic identity and ethnic conflict have stressed, ethnic and cultural identities are social and political constructions so it is misleading at best to call them “pre-political.” Second, a commitment to a political culture is always more than a commitment to an abstract set of ideals. It is a commitment to a historically contingent political culture, constituted in part by ethnocultural elements. We need to distinguish two different meanings of “political” that Habermas blurs together. What he calls “political culture” is political in the sense that it pertains to the institutions and practices of government. But a very different sense of political is suggested by his use of the term “pre-political” which he defines as “something independent of and prior to the political opinion- and will-formation of the citizens themselves,” suggesting a second sense of “political” as the product of people’s reflective choices.¹⁶ By Habermas’s own definition, the “political culture” of a community is pre-political in that its content—the constitution and its interpretations; the political history; the symbols, rituals, and anthems of a political community—is not chosen by citizens but inherited from prior generations. Membership in liberal democratic communities is also pre-political in that citizenship is typically determined by birth, not choice. Indeed, “political culture” may be an object of passionate identification precisely because one is born into it and raised within its traditions and rituals. Political communities are more like communities of descent than constitutional patriots acknowledge, not only because they are inherited from generation to generation but also because they are permeated by ethnocultural elements.

¹⁶ Habermas 1998b: 115.

To elaborate the point, consider the question of what it means to be an American. In Habermas's view, the United States is a leading example of a country based on shared political ideals, as opposed to a shared ethnicity, religion, or culture. Benjamin Barber echoes this view when he says, "The American trick was to use the fierce attachments of patriotic sentiment to bond a people to high ideals."¹⁷ The sources of American identity include the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, Abraham Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, and Martin Luther King, Jr.'s "I Have a Dream" speech—all highlight the values of liberty, equality, and democracy. The understanding of American identity as a set of shared ideals is commonplace. Yet, however much the United States has come to stand for certain political principles, it also comes "loaded with inherited cultural baggage" that is contingent upon its particular history.¹⁸ The historian Philip Gleason outlines the following popular narrative about American identity: "To be or to become an American, a person did not have to be any particular national, linguistic, religious, or ethnic background. All he had to do was to commit himself to the political ideology centered on the abstract ideals of liberty, equality, and republicanism. Thus the universalist ideological character of American nationality meant that it was open to anyone who willed to become an American." Gleason adds, however, that "universalism had its limits from the beginning, because it did not include either blacks or Indians, and in time other racial and cultural groups were regarded as falling outside the range of American nationality." In concluding his discussion of American identity, Gleason emphasizes, "An American nationality does in fact exist... it is a distinctive sense of peoplehood, not different in essence from the peoplehood-sense of ethnic groups, which furnishes what Justice Felix Frankfurter once called 'the binding tie of cohesive sentiment'"

¹⁷ Barber 1996: 32.

¹⁸ Yack 1996: 196.

underlying the common life of the political community.¹⁹ Indeed, ethnic myths of belonging have formed a key part of American civic identity. As Rogers Smith has argued in light of detailed examination of American citizenship laws, American identity is constituted by multiple traditions, not only liberalism and republicanism but also “ideologies of ascriptive inequality” that have defined American political identity in racial, ethnic, religious, and gendered terms.²⁰

It is possible, in the abstract, to construct accounts of belonging without prepolitical elements by focusing on principles, as constitutional patriots urge, but in practice ethnic, religious, and racial elements have proved too seductive to resist in constructing narratives of belonging to the political community. Habermas recognizes this, but he makes the further claim that political culture can escape ethnocultural particularity altogether. I do not think this is possible. Contemporary multicultural theory has focused in particular on language and other cultural attributes associated with ethnicity. The state can avoid having an established religion, but it cannot avoid giving preferential treatment to one culture when it comes to choosing a language for public schooling and other state services.²¹ Insofar as public institutions rely on a single language or other cultural attributes for their functioning, political cultures can never be purely political in Habermas’s sense of being the product of citizen deliberation and choice. This suggests that constitutional patriotism is better understood as a type of nationalism, not a distinctive alternative to it, a type that privileges shared principles and values over ethnocultural elements but which cannot entirely escape the latter. If ethnocultural elements are an inescapable part of a conception of civic solidarity, rather than

¹⁹ Gleason 1980: 31-32, 56-57.

²⁰ See Smith 1997.

²¹ Kymlicka 1995: 111; Carens 2000: 77-78; Patten 2001: 693.

supposing they can be transcended, we need to consider which ethnocultural elements should be included and why.

2. *Liberal Nationalism*

Liberal nationalists offer a view of civic solidarity based on a shared national culture. I focus in this section on the work of one leading liberal nationalist, David Miller. A common national identity is said to be necessary for social trust, which in turn helps resolve collective action problems, enables deliberative democracy, and supports redistributive welfare-state policies. At times, liberal nationalists go so far as to suggest that a shared national culture is *necessary* for the viability of liberal democracy. Miller argues that the realization of “democracy and social justice presupposes national communities in which mutual trust stems from a national identity.”²² I will not attempt a thorough evaluation of this thesis here, though I will offer some doubts along the way. In my view, a weaker version of this thesis is more plausible: trust is more likely to exist among people who share a common national identity, and such trust facilitates the realization of liberal democracy. Whether we adopt the strong or weak liberal nationalist thesis, the implication is the same: states should actively foster a common national culture in light of the beneficial political consequences that a shared national identity can deliver. After examining the content and role of national identity, I want to raise a challenge that liberal nationalists must meet.

2.1 *The content and role of national identity*

Miller’s account of national identity includes the following elements: a shared belief among its members that they belong together, historical continuity stretching across

²² Miller 1998: 49.

generations, connection to a particular territory, and a shared set of characteristics constituting a national culture. This last feature is what constitutional patriots would stress in distinguishing themselves from liberal nationalists. But as I argued above, constitutional patriotism also relies on a historically contingent national culture. In presenting the idea of a national identity, Miller says that “a national identity requires that the people who share it should have something in common, a set of characteristics that in the past was often referred to as a ‘national character,’ but which I prefer to describe as a common public culture.”²³ It is not enough to share a *common identity* constituted by shared sentiments based on a shared history or a shared territory; a shared *national culture* is a necessary feature of national identity. I share a national culture with someone, even if we never meet, if each of us has a personal history involving the national culture. Each of us has been initiated into the traditions and customs of a national culture.

What sort of content makes up a national culture? Miller says that it is hard to pin down, and proceeds by pointing out what it does not entail. First, the shared characteristic is not based on biological descent, a view which he says leads toward racism. He emphasizes that sharing a common public culture is, in principle, compatible with people belonging to a diversity of racial and ethnic groups. Second, every member need not have been born in the homeland. So “immigration need not pose problems, provided only that the immigrants come to share a common national identity, to which they may contribute their own distinctive ingredients.”²⁴ Third, the national culture need not be monolithic and all-embracing. A national culture is a public culture constituted by a set of shared understandings about how a group of people is to conduct its life together. A national culture includes not only cultural

²³ Miller 1995: 25.

²⁴ Ibid. 25-26.

ideals and religious beliefs but also social norms and political principles. He says that its range will vary from case to case, but it will leave room for different “private cultures” within the nation. Lastly, Miller emphasizes that instead of thinking that for any given nation there is a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for belonging to that nation, we should think in terms of Wittgenstein’s metaphor of a thread whose strength “does not reside in the fact that some one fibre runs through its whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibres.” Miller notes that people are hard pressed to articulate what the national character of their people consists in, and yet they have “an intuitive sense, when confronted with foreigners, of where the differences lie.”²⁵ To their credit, liberal nationalists have attempted to develop inclusive models of national community while emphasizing the importance of some minimum cultural homogeneity. As I will argue, however, ethnic and national cultures are not as easily separable as liberal nationalists suggest.

Miller’s defense of nationality rests on the role it plays in fostering social trust, which in turn is necessary to (i) overcome collective action problems, (ii) foster democratic politics, and (iii) support redistributive policies of the welfare state. As I will point out, these different roles for nationality implicate three distinct conceptions of trust.

Consider first the role of national identity in fostering trust to overcome collective action problems. Miller argues that to secure “the voluntary cooperation of citizens...each person must be confident that the others will generally comply—and this involves mutual trust.” He gives the example of state assistance to particular groups within the population, such as financial support to an industry hard hit by changes in the terms of trade or special funding for the urban poor. “Such a practice cannot evolve if each sectional group jealously guards its own interests and insists that each dispensation should be strictly egalitarian.”

²⁵ Ibid. 26-27.

Voluntary cooperation requires mutual trust, and mutual trust requires “ties of community” which are “an important source of trust between individuals who are not personally known to one another and who are in no position directly to monitor one another’s behavior.” Not any communal tie but only a shared *national* identity can foster the requisite social trust within a state. As Miller argues, “In states lacking a common national identity... politics at best takes the form of group bargaining and compromise and at worst degenerates into a struggle for domination. Trust may exist within the groups, but not across them.”²⁶

Is a common national identity necessary for trust between citizens? It depends on what you mean by trust. In discussing collective action problems, Miller invokes a conception of trust that appeals to *rationality*—under what conditions it is rational for citizens to cooperate. If we are talking about this type of trust, we can further disaggregate the idea. At the very least, we might distinguish between political trust in institutions and interpersonal trust between individuals. Take political trust first. Does it require a shared national culture? Chinese journalists accused of a crime may well trust an American court to grant a fair trial more than they trust a Chinese court, even though the journalists share a common Chinese culture.²⁷ Or to take an example of interpersonal trust, in a market transaction, I may trust a member of another cultural group than someone from my own culture if the other group had a reputation for being trustworthy and my own group had a reputation for being hucksters. These examples cast doubt on the claim that a shared national culture is necessary for social trust. A history of past performance and reputation for trustworthiness may be more promising candidates for bases of trust than shared nationality.

²⁶ Miller 1995: 91-93.

²⁷ Here I am indebted to Abizadeh’s discussion of Miller (2002: 501).

A second role that liberal nationalists attribute to national identity is fostering trust that enables deliberative democracy. Citizens must trust one another in order for democracy, understood as a deliberative mode of collective decision-making, to function effectively, and national identity makes this trust possible. The deliberative ideal of democracy requires that citizens be willing to moderate their claims in the hope of finding common ground on which policy decisions can be based. The idea is that if I relinquish a position I feel strongly about now in order to reach an outcome that has widespread support, then I expect others to reciprocate in the future. Here the term “trust” seems to mean something like the *reasonableness* of citizens rather than their rationality. Miller suggests that citizens will be more inclined to reason in certain ways—by taking the interests of others to heart and moderating their claims in response—because they share national bonds of affection. As he puts it, “[T]o the extent that we aspire to form a democracy in which all citizens are at some level involved in discussion of public issues, we must look to the conditions under which citizens can respect one another’s good faith in searching for grounds of agreement. Among large aggregates of people, only a common nationality can provide the sense of solidarity that makes this possible.”²⁸ In the absence of a common nationality, Miller suggests in the context of expressing skepticism about a Europe-wide practice of democratic citizenship, there would not be a single unified “European public opinion” but rather “separate bodies of public opinion that could then be fed into elite negotiations at the European level.”²⁹

The aspect of national identity at the heart of Miller’s discussion of deliberative democracy is language. Europe-wide debates among elites are increasingly conducted in English, and as a result, Miller says, “these debates will remain opaque to those who [only]

²⁸ Miller 1995: 98.

²⁹ Miller 1998: 50.

speak a different language.”³⁰ In the absence of a common language, there will be little mutual understanding and therefore, little trust. And in the absence of trust, citizens will not be willing to consider the interests of other and moderate their claims in order to find common ground. It is important to note that the challenges of linguistic diversity can be (and in multilingual democracies have been) addressed through translators, multilingual media, and multilingual ballots, and at the societal level, the challenges of linguistic diversity are not insuperable. People are and can become multilingual; the citizens of Canada, Belgium, and Switzerland are living examples. So, linguistic homogeneity may not be necessary for the sort of mutual understanding required for democratic deliberation. But Miller’s weaker thesis is hard to refute: that sharing a culture—in particular, a language—makes communication and mutual understanding easier, all other things equal.

The third role that Miller attributes to national identity has to do with its role in fostering support for principles of distributive justice expressed in welfare state policies. Welfare states that aim “to win democratic legitimation must be rooted in communities whose members recognize such obligations of justice to one another... [N]ational communities are indeed of this kind.”³¹ Here Miller suggests that to trust one another is simply to accept obligations of justice toward one another. To elaborate, he cites to Brian Barry who has argued that redistribution within a polity is facilitated not only by “the presence of fellow-feeling” and a “sympathetic attachment to the interests of all those within the polity,” but also by “trust in the willingness of others to reciprocate benefits when the need arises.” Barry adds that “there is a strong causal link between cultural similarity and trust.”³² The notion of trust at work here seems to appeal to both the rationality and reasonableness of citizens. When it

³⁰ Miller 1998: 50.

³¹ Miller 1995: 93.

³² Barry 1991: 174-75, 177.

comes to redistributive policies, people are more likely to cooperate and are more likely to consider the needs and interests of others when they are bound together by a shared national identity.

We might object to the claim about the necessity of national identity for redistributive policies by pointing to Canada, Belgium, and Switzerland, which are multinational countries with strong welfare states. And there is the U.S., whose citizens possess a strong national identity but which has a weak welfare state. Miller anticipates and responds to these objections in the following way. First, he says that Americans share a strong nationality, but what matters is not just the strength but also the character of national identity. The American nation is “unusually individualistic” rather than “solidaristic” and therefore, has been reluctant to support redistributive policies.³³ Here Miller risks trivializing the role that he wants to attribute to national cultures. His general thesis is that sharing a national culture leads citizens to be concerned for one another, which would include support for redistributive policies. But in discussing the US, he suggests that sharing a national culture is neither necessary nor sufficient for there to be support for redistributive policies. What may actually be doing the work of generating support (or not) for welfare state policies are shared beliefs and principles about who owes what to whom and why, and not the fact that citizens are bound together by a common language and customs. Miller folds the former (beliefs and principles) into his definition of national culture, but I think they are worth distinguishing from a shared language and other ethnocultural attributes, since it may be the former that motivates support for redistribution.

Miller’s second reply, regarding Belgium, Switzerland, and Canada, says that these countries cannot be described as “simply multinational.” The Swiss today share “a common

³³ Miller 1995: 94.

national identity *as Swiss* over and above their separate linguistic, religious, and cantonal identities,” just as the Québécois share a Canadian national identity with Anglophones.³⁴ Here Miller’s argument exploits an ambiguity between two senses of nationality, between sharing a national culture, including a common language and other cultural attributes (e.g. Quebec), and a more capacious national identity that does not require sharing a language and other cultural attributes (e.g. Canada). Miller suggests that both Quebec and Canada are cultural nations. But in light of the relative weakness of Canadian nationhood in comparison with Québécois nationhood and also the desire of many Québécois to separate from Canada, can it really be a strong sense of Canadian nationhood that explains support for strong redistributive policies within Canada? Widespread support for redistributive policies may well stem from other factors— a shared commitment to principles of social justice, calculations of self-interest as a kind of insurance against bad luck in the future, or a concern to meet the needs of others so they can become fully participating citizens.

Miller’s arguments are ultimately empirical arguments for which we may never have sufficient evidence. For example, how can we test the claim that national identity is necessary for redistributive welfare-state policies when there are no actually existing democracies which have strong welfare states and are also tied together by nothing but allegiance to the state itself? What empirical studies demonstrate is that there is a strong negative correlation between ethnic diversity and social trust. Robert Putnam has found that ethnic diversity tends to reduce social trust and social capital at the neighborhood level: “Inter-racial trust is relatively high in homogeneous South Dakota and relatively low in heterogeneous San Francisco or Los Angeles. The more ethnically diverse the people we live around, the less we trust them.” It is not only out-group trust but also in-group trust that is lower in more diverse

³⁴ Ibid. 94-95.

settings. In ethnically diverse neighborhoods, residents of all groups tend to ‘hunker down’ or pull in like turtles.³⁵ Other studies have found negative correlations between ethnic diversity and levels of redistributive expenditures between American cities and states.³⁶ But we need to be careful in the conclusions we draw from such studies since the causal mechanisms between ethnic diversity and social trust, as well as between ethnic diversity and redistribution, are not obvious.³⁷ There are places with high ethnic diversity and low social trust that exhibit greater support for redistributive policies (e.g. San Francisco) than places with lower levels of ethnic diversity and higher levels of social trust (e.g. South Dakota). So the strong liberal nationalist thesis about the necessity of national identity for resolving collective action problems, fostering deliberative democracy, and supporting redistributive policies remains a piece of psychological speculation. The weaker thesis that social trust is more likely among “people who share a common national identity, speak a common language, and have overlapping cultural values” seems plausible,³⁸ but liberal nationalists have not shown that *only* a shared national identity can foster social trust.

2.2 *On the inclusiveness of nationalist solidarity*

My concern with liberal nationalism is not so much whether it can foster social trust but how inclusive it is of ethnic and religious diversity. We need to take a closer look at what it is that liberal nationalists think national identity consists of. As I argued above, cultural elements are an inescapable feature of political communities. In contrast to constitutional patriots, liberal nationalists acknowledge that the state cannot be culturally neutral even if it

³⁵ Putnam 2007: 147, 149. See also Alesina and La Ferrara 2002.

³⁶ Alesina, Baquir, and Easterly 1999 and Hero and Tolbert 1996.

³⁷ See Banting and Kymlicka 2006.

³⁸ Miller 1998: 48.

tried. States cannot avoid coercing citizens into preserving a national culture of some kind. This is because state institutions and laws define a political culture, which in turn shapes the range of customs and practices of daily life that constitute a broader national culture. Proponents of liberal nationalism have focused on the idea of *culture*, as opposed to ethnicity or descent, in order to reconcile nationalism with liberalism. In contrasting his “thicker” nationalist view of solidarity from “purely political” patriotic versions, Miller points to “inherited culture,” including a shared history, a common language, and sometimes also a common religion, as the proper basis of solidarity.³⁹

While thicker than constitutional patriotism, liberal nationalism is said to be thinner than ethnic models of belonging. While both nationality and ethnicity have cultural components, what is said to distinguish ‘civic’ nations from ‘ethnic’ nations is that the latter is exclusionary and closed on grounds of what is believed to be biological descent, whereas the former is in principle open to anyone willing to adopt the national culture.⁴⁰ National cultures, based as they are on a shared language and shared principles, are open in a way that ethnic cultures, based on blood and descent, are not. In order to gain admission to a civic nation, one need not be a member of a particular racial or ethnic group; rather, all one needs to do is express a willingness to live by the ideals of the political community and learn the national language, as well as adapt to other aspects of the national culture. Determining whether these criteria or any other are acceptable criteria of membership requires asking not only whether someone can meet them but also why they should. Liberal nationalists make assimilation into the national culture a condition of membership without explicitly questioning how the national culture, which gives content to the requirements of assimilation, is constituted.

³⁹ Miller 1995: 189.

⁴⁰ For different versions of the distinction between ethnic and civic nationalism and defenses of the latter, see Barber 1996, Ignatieff 1993, Kymlicka 1995, and Tamir 1993.

The root of the problem is that every nation has an “ethnic core.” No civic nation has been able to achieve neutrality between the ethnic groups within it. As Anthony Smith observes, “[M]odern ‘civic’ nations have not in practice really transcended ethnicity or ethnic sentiments. This is a Western mirage, reality-as-wish; closer examination always reveals the ethnic core of civic nations, in practice, even in immigrant societies with their early pioneering and dominant (English and Spanish) culture in America, Australia, or Argentina, a culture that provided the myths and language of the would-be nation.”⁴¹ Once liberal nationalists acknowledge that all national cultures have ethnic cores, they need an answer to why ethnic minorities outside the ethnic core should embrace the national culture. There are at least two strategies of argument one could adopt. One might take the democratic line that says we should embrace the national culture because it is the product of collective deliberation. Alternatively, one might take a contractualist line that says we should embrace the national culture because citizens have consented to it, or an argument about reasonableness that says it would be reasonable for individuals to accept the historically contingent national culture of the society of which they are members.

Miller takes the democratic line. He acknowledges that “national identities invariably contain some ethnic ingredients”; they have typically been formed from the ethnic group that is dominant in a particular territory and today bears “the hallmarks of that group: language, religion, cultural identity.” He recognizes that this “ethnic ingredient” in national identity is “inherently problematic.” Groups outside the ethnic core cannot be expected straightforwardly to embrace the national identity that is on offer since this would create “internal strains” and put the outsider group at a practical disadvantage. He points to Muslim identity in contemporary Britain, which becomes politicized when British national identity is conceived

⁴¹ Smith 1986: 216.

as containing “an Anglo-Saxon bias which discriminates against Muslims (and other ethnic minorities).”⁴² Miller responds that British nationality need not contain an Anglo-Saxon bias since the content of nationality, unlike ethnicity, is “shaped more deliberately by political discussion in the course of which, in democratic states, each smaller group can make its voice heard.”⁴³ Miller suggests that the appropriate basis for assessing national identities is the process by which it has arisen: “To the extent that the process involves inputs from all sections of the community, with groups openly competing to imprint the common identity with their own particular image, we may justifiably regard the identity that emerges as an authentic one.”⁴⁴

Yet, the core of national cultures is not typically “the product of political debate” or “shaped by processes of rational reflection to which members of the community can contribute on an equal footing.”⁴⁵ This is not to say that national cultures are solely the legacy of the conquest and dominance of particular racial and ethnic groups over others. National cultures are a product of both coercion and domination of some over others and the product of democratic debate. Miller’s redescription of “national character” as the capacious-sounding “common public culture” papers over the historically violent and oppressive acts that have forged modern nations and given national cultures their particular content. In the course of liberalization, Western states relinquished the notion that a common religion was integral for national integration, but the opposite occurred with respect to language, which moved to the fore as the single most important element in the construction of national identity.⁴⁶ A common means of communication was seen as crucial to nation-building. Nation-building,

⁴² Ibid. 122-123.

⁴³ Ibid. 135.

⁴⁴ Ibid. 39, 40.

⁴⁵ Ibid. 68, 70.

⁴⁶ Zolberg and Woon 1999.

including the consolidation of a single national language, has been fueled by more malignant motives than the need for a common language—not least racism and xenophobia—such that forging a common language has historically involved the domination and suppression of minority languages and identities.

That the cultural core of liberal democratic societies is the culture of historically dominant ethnic groups is a point that Samuel Huntington's recent account of American national identity unabashedly accepts. Like Miller, Huntington views national culture as a key element of national identity, but Huntington is much more explicit than Miller in specifying the content of national culture. The principal theme of Huntington's book is the centrality of what he calls "Anglo-Protestant culture" to American national identity. According to Huntington, there have been four elements to American national identity: race, ethnicity, culture, and ideology. Like Miller, he rejects race and ethnicity as constituent elements of national identity, and he is convinced that ideology is "a weak glue to hold together people otherwise lacking in racial, ethnic, or cultural sources of community." It is not just the political inefficacy of values-based solidarity that seems to motivate Huntington's arguments. In his 1984 book, *Promise of Disharmony*, Huntington defended a "civic" view of American identity as based on the "political ideas of the American creed."⁴⁷ His views seem to have changed partly as a response to immigrants maintaining dual nationalities and loyalties ("becoming ampersand Americans") and his perception of Mexican immigrants creating bilingual, bicultural, and potentially separatist regions.⁴⁸

In the face of these "deconstructionist" forces, he calls for Americans of all races and ethnicities to "reinvigorate their core culture." Huntington defines culture as "a people's

⁴⁷ Huntington 1984: 46.

⁴⁸ Huntington 2004b: 138, 247.

language, religious beliefs, social and political values, assumptions as to what is right and wrong, appropriate and inappropriate, and to the objective institutions and behavioral patterns that reflect these subjective elements.”⁴⁹ Huntington, like Miller, assumes that ethnicity and culture are easily separable. Yet, his definition of American national culture includes ethnic and religious elements. Reinvigorating American culture would mean embracing a vision of America as, he says, “a deeply religious and primarily Christian country, encompassing several religious minorities, adhering to Anglo-Protestant values, speaking English, maintaining its European cultural heritage, and committed to the principles of the Creed” which include the political principles of liberty, equality, democracy, individualism, and private property.⁵⁰ I do not see how “Anglo-Protestant” culture is anything but a web of beliefs and practices informed by ethnicity and religion.

So national cultures have ethnic cores. I think this fact is normatively troubling for ethnically diverse democracies. Why should ethnic minorities outside the ethnic core embrace the national culture? Are they not owed special accommodations? I think liberal nationalists need to answer these questions, addressing the following considerations. Whether special accommodations are owed to those outside the ethnic core will depend on the nature of the interests burdened by the establishment of an ethnic culture as national culture. If “ethnic culture” includes religious beliefs and practices, then the religious liberty of those who adhere to minority religions will be burdened. If religious liberty is a fundamental liberty and if all members are entitled to protection of this liberty, as liberals typically maintain, then such burdens will not be justifiable. Putting religion aside, language is also at the heart of concerns about the establishment of culture. In contrast to religion, the burdens imposed by the

⁴⁹ Ibid. 30.

⁵⁰ Ibid. 20, 46.

requirement to learn the dominant language are arguably not as weighty as burdens on religious liberty, though some might argue that they are an affront to the dignity of speakers of minority languages and must be compensated in some way (van Parijs). On the issue of language, liberal multiculturalists have relied on the idea of consent to decide the question of whether those outside the linguistic mainstream with respect to language or other cultural attributes are owed special accommodations. With respect to immigrants, the choice to immigrate is seen as canceling the claim for special linguistic accommodations, other than transitional bilingual programs that assist in the cultural and economic integration of immigrants.⁵¹ With respect to groups whose languages were made vulnerable by historical injustices perpetrated by the state, as in the case of indigenous groups in North America and Australia, one might make a case that they are owed special accommodations to protect or revive their languages.⁵² I cannot explore these considerations here; my point here is that liberal nationalists must respond to them.

3. *“Deep Diversity”*

Constitutional patriotism and liberal nationalism are accounts of civic solidarity that deal with what one might call first-level diversity. Individuals have different cultural backgrounds and hold divergent moral and religious outlooks, yet they all share the same idea of what it means to belong to a country. They share a uniform mode of belonging, either as co-nationals sharing the relevant cultural attributes or patriots committed to the same set of

⁵¹ Miller might take a democratic approach that says linguistic minorities should make their claims for special accommodations through the political process. The problem with this, from the liberal standpoint, is that linguistic minorities will likely lose, especially if the majority is hostile to the minority.

⁵² See May 2003 and Tully 1995.

ideals. There is a second-level diversity that acknowledges not only the diversity of outlooks and ways of life, but also a diversity of ways of belonging.

This second-level diversity is what Charles Taylor has called “deep diversity.” The appeal of this model of belonging is its greater inclusiveness, especially for countries with many different kinds of groups. Taylor introduces the idea of deep diversity in the context of discussing the idea of belonging to Canada. Migrants of Italian or Vietnamese background might feel Canadian as “a bearer of individual rights in a multicultural mosaic.” But such a vision of being Canadian falls short of accommodating all Canadians. For Quebeckers, their way of being Canadian (for those who still want to be) is by belonging to a distinct national community within Canada, *la nation québécoise*. Similarly, members of First Nations who identify with Canada may identify in part through their membership in aboriginal communities. Belonging to Canada as a Quebecker or a Cree is very different from belonging as an immigrant.

Taylor emphasizes that deep diversity is the only formula on which a united federal Canada can be rebuilt. Many other countries resemble Canada in having diversity generated not only by immigration but also by conquest and forcible incorporation.⁵³ Even though Taylor contrasts Canada with the U.S., implicitly accepting the myth of America as a nation of immigrants, the U.S. also has a need for acknowledgment of diverse modes of belonging. The history of enslavement and exclusion of African Americans, the history of conquest and forcible incorporation of Native Americans, the history of voluntary migration and adaptation by immigrants—members of these different groups have distinctive ways of belonging to the political community. Within the category “immigrant” the diversity of immigrant

⁵³ Taylor 1993: 182-83.

backgrounds and their different modes of incorporation will shape their sense of belonging to the community.

Taylor's deep diversity model suggests that citizens need share neither a national culture nor political principles. Citizens may have very different interpretations of the ideals embodied in their polity's institutions—different conceptions of freedom, equality, and justice—such that they cannot be said to share principles. They may speak different languages and practice different customs such that they cannot be said to share a culture. What then holds citizens together? One elaboration of the deep diversity approach focuses on the vertical relationship between citizens and the state. Andrew Mason has argued for a model of “belonging to the polity” in contrast to the model of “belonging together.” In the former, citizens value and identify with most of the major institutions and feel at home in them, but each does so for different reasons. Mason believes that citizens could identify with their polity's institutions and central practices without believing “there was any deep reason why they should associate together.”⁵⁴ But in a democratic society, what does a sense of belonging to the polity amount to but a sense of belonging together? In a democratic society, the citizens ultimately authorize the acts of political institutions. The laws and institutions of a democratic society are supposed to reflect the values and preferences of citizens. To identify with political institutions or the political culture is in part to identify with fellow citizens.

It is an open question whether a vertical sense of belonging is sufficient to generate a sense of solidarity. If not, the deep diversity model will have to be elaborated in a way that provides an account of the horizontal relation between citizens. One might analogize with friendship. Say you and I meet by accident, not unlike being thrown into the relationship of co-citizenship through birth in a particular state. We have common experiences and over time

⁵⁴ See Mason 2000: 127, 137.

we come to share a personal history, which forms the basis of our bond. We come to value this bond, and valuing it gives each of us reasons to act in certain ways toward one another. Each of us may value the bond for different reasons and may engage in the relationship in different ways over time. We may even disagree about the values that govern our relationship and what our common identity does or should consist of. What unites us is that we value and identify with the bond itself.

While appealing for its inclusiveness, the problem with the deep diversity model is that it is unlikely to unite citizens unless they already embrace second-level diversity in the first place.⁵⁵ Citizens have to want to live in a society with diverse forms of cultural and political membership, and accept that people have different ways of and reasons for belonging to the political community. There has to be toleration for the right reasons. An example of an unstable form of toleration, based on strategic compromise, may be the old Dutch model that evolved after centuries of religious strife. Every Dutch citizen was a part of one of the “pillars” (Protestant, Catholic, secular humanist) that held up Dutch society. Each pillar had its own neighborhoods, schools, unions, hospitals, and in time state-supported media. Conflicts between members of the pillars were resolved by elite representatives from each. The Dutch pillar model was not based on acceptance of values of equality or diversity but a *modus vivendi*. The acceptance of second-level diversity seems to require more than a strategic compromise; it depends on the acceptance of first-level diversity. Respect for diverse modes of belonging to the political community seems to require respect for the value of diversity itself or some other set of shared values, such as the idea of persons as free and

⁵⁵ As Kymlicka puts it, deep diversity is “the product of mutual solidarity, not a possible basis for it” (1995: 191).

equal. In the absence of shared values or a strong sense of shared identity of some sort, it is not clear why citizens would adopt deep diversity.

4. Implications for immigrant integration

Constitutional patriotism, liberal nationalism, and deep diversity might be viewed as three distinct models of belonging to the political community in that each privileges certain elements over others. But as we saw, each contains elements of the others. Constitutional patriotism implicitly relies on shared cultural attributes. Liberal nationalism depends on a commitment to certain political principles to do much of the work of supporting democracy and social justice. To be a viable model of solidarity, the deep diversity model may well require a shared commitment to certain values, including perhaps the value of diversity itself. Of the three models of civic solidarity examined above, I find deep diversity to be the most promising because it is the most inclusive. but only if it were revised in the direction of constitutional patriotism—that is, only if deep diversity is developed in a way that focuses on some minimum set of shared values and practices. Otherwise, I am not sure it can be a basis for real solidarity among citizens. In this section, I want to focus on the elements that each model privileges, and consider what each suggests for setting out terms of integration for immigrants.

Under a regime of constitutional patriotism, the crucial test of membership would be the acceptance of the common principles and values of the polity. As Habermas puts it, because the identity of the political community depends primarily on “the legal principles anchored in the *political culture* and not on an *ethical-cultural* form of life,” all that is expected of immigrants is that they “willingly engage in the political culture of their new

home, without necessarily abandoning the cultural life specific to their country of origin. The *political acculturation* demanded of them does not extend to the whole of their socialization.”

Acculturation is a two-way street: immigrants adopt the values and political culture of the host country, and “by importing new forms of life, immigrants can expand or multiply the perspectives from which the shared political constitution must be interpreted.”⁵⁶

Constitutional patriotism privileges shared values over shared cultural attributes. So under constitutional patriotism, there would be a *prima facie* case for civic inclusion for those who reside within a polity, endorse the basic principles of the polity, and express a willingness to become members. On such a regime, naturalization policy would not be based on racial or ethnic background. So the Japanese policy (until the late 1980s) requiring naturalized citizens to adopt a Japanese family name would not be permissible. Nor would an interminable exclusion of non-ethnically German guestworkers from German citizenship.⁵⁷

But cultural elements would inevitably sneak in. Habermas himself acknowledges that in many countries, the “majority culture” is “fused” with the “general political culture which claims to be recognized by *all* citizens regardless of their cultural background.” He responds by arguing that this fusion should be “dissolved”: “The level of the shared political culture must be uncoupled from the level of subcultures and their pre-political identities.”⁵⁸ The problem here, as I have argued, is that political culture and ethnic cultures are not separable.

⁵⁶ Habermas 1996: 513-514.

⁵⁷ The recruited labor migrants (*Gastarbeiter*) were designated as “aliens” (*Auslander*) under the 1965 German Alien Law. In contrast, ethnic Germans were the only foreign nationals whom postwar Germany accepted as permanent residents set on the path toward citizenship; they were treated as “resettlers” (*Aussiedler*) who acted on their constitutional right to return to their country of origin rather than as mere immigrants (Joppke 2001: 44). Until 2000, *jus sanguinis* rules of citizenship excluded foreign workers and their descendants from German citizenship. In 2000, the German government moved from a strictly *jus sanguinis* rule toward one that combines *jus sanguinis* and *jus soli*. It also requires a minimum length of residency of 8 (down from 10) years, and it does not formally recognize dual citizenship. German citizenship laws remain the least inclusive if inclusiveness is measured by the following criteria: whether citizenship is granted by *jus soli* (whether children of non-citizens who are born in a country’s territory can acquire citizenship), the length of the residency requirement for naturalization, and whether naturalized immigrants are permitted to hold dual citizenship (Howard 2006).

⁵⁸ Habermas 1998: 118.

In a recent elaboration and defense of constitutional patriotism, Jan-Werner Müller argues that it would be permissible, under a regime of constitutional patriotism, to require those seeking inclusion to learn the main language of the country and acquire some knowledge of the history of the host country. Language is a central element of ethnic culture, so it would be claiming too much for constitutional patriotism to conclude, as Müller does, that constitutional patriotism would provide a more just framework for immigrant integration policy than nationalism on the grounds that the former would not mandate policies “contaminated with culture and ethnicity.”⁵⁹

Liberal nationalism, however, would lend more support than constitutional patriotism to policies that reinforce the existing national culture: immigration policies that give weight to ethnic preferences; citizenship tests focused on cultural attributes, including language, manners, and customs; additional or special requirements imposed on those groups outside the nation’s cultural core. Liberal nationalists do not view immigration as a problem so long as immigrants come to adopt the common national identity. Their concern is not to defend current members’ efforts to prevent cultural change, but rather their efforts to control the rate of cultural change. Their arguments express a fear of excessive cultural change and a desire to preserve the cultural core of the nation. Liberal nationalism suggests that insofar as cultural diversity threatens to undermine the national culture, the state should limit immigration to inhibit any further increase in cultural diversity, or pursue a policy of assimilation among groups that threaten the national culture. Samuel Huntington’s fear of Mexican immigrants and their resistance to cultural assimilation is one prominent example.⁶⁰ A regime of liberal

⁵⁹ Müller 2007: 87.

⁶⁰ See Huntington 2004a. Critics have called Huntington’s alarm is “excessive” and prescriptions “pernicious.” They argue that the limits to the educational and economic progress of Mexican immigrants are not due to an

nationalism would require immigrants to assimilate into the nation's cultural core. In the U.S. this would mean requiring immigrants not only to acquire knowledge of U.S. history and embrace American political ideals, expressed through an oath of allegiance, but also learn English and assimilate into the customs and mores that characterize the cultural core of American national identity.

In contrast, the deep diversity model implies a wide range of group-based accommodations or multiculturalism policies to immigrants. Not surprisingly, the official multiculturalism and settlement policies of Canada may come closest to the deep diversity model but with a constitutional patriotic twist—people respect not just second-level diversity but also certain values (of equality? fairness? diversity?) that lends support to their respect for second-level diversity. Canadian settlement programs aim to ease an immigrants' transition into the labor market and promote cultural integration. They include language and citizenship classes, job-placement services, and health and welfare assistance. Such policies are consistent with all three of the models of civic solidarity I have considered. What makes Canada more an example of deep diversity than liberal nationalism is a commitment to the value of ethnic diversity expressed through multiculturalism policies, including funding for ethnic associations, promoting cultural activities, and supporting heritage language schools. Such policies imply that acquiring Canadian citizenship does not require renouncing former identities and loyalties and that political participation is not at odds with continued attachment to the homeland.⁶¹

unwillingness to integrate but instead are the product of ongoing barriers facing all poor Americans and the perverse effects of border enforcement (Smith 2004 and Cornelius 2004).

⁶¹ See Bloemraad 2006: 118-126. While Canadian multiculturalism reflects deep diversity with regard to immigrants, it seems to have originated as a way to counter rising French Canadian nationalism, suggesting a lack of Canada-wide deep diversity with respect to other groups, including Quebec and aboriginal communities.

Outside Canada hoping for deep diversity may be unrealistically utopian. In places like Britain and the Netherlands, there has been a retreat from multiculturalism policies and a movement toward emphasis on a uniform mode of belonging. If any of the models examined in this paper are dominant in liberal democratic societies today, it is a version of liberal nationalism. In the Netherlands, immigrants who arrive from outside the European Union are required to report to local authorities for an interview. Based on their knowledge of the Dutch language, level of education, and age, authorities decide whether a newcomer has to attend a course paid for by the government, which consists of 500 hours of language training and 100 hours for social and civic skills. The general aim of the course is to familiarize newcomers with the language, culture, and society of the Netherlands.⁶² Since 2006, the Dutch government requires those aspiring to Dutch citizenship to watch a film in which two gay men are kissing and a topless woman is walking on a beach. The film sends the message that tolerance of homosexuality and nude beaches are at the core of Dutch culture. What it means to be Dutch is constituted by both liberal values (e.g. gender equality, equality for gays and lesbians) and cultural elements (e.g. Dutch language, nude beaches). The film seems to have been made with Muslim immigrants in mind. About one-third of the three million *allochtonen*—immigrants and their children who were born in the Netherlands—are Muslim, most of them Moroccans and Turks. The Dutch have rejected the old model of special accommodations for ethnic and religious minorities in favor of a model of nationalist belonging, partly out of a concern to uphold the country's values and distinctive national culture.

Ongoing political debates about the “integration of immigrants” in the West point toward the need for critical examination of existing models of civic solidarity. In examining

⁶² Entzinger 2003: 77.

three leading models, I have suggested that ethnocultural elements are an inescapable part of narratives of belonging to a political community, and raised the challenge of how to make these models more inclusive for those who fall outside the ethnic and religious core of existing national narratives. The paper has largely assumed that civic solidarity is important (for the reasons I stated in the introduction), but this assumption needs defending. The perhaps bigger cosmopolitan challenge of defending the particularism about political responsibility implicit in all models of civic solidarity I leave for another day.

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